Dividends: cause of or cure to earnings management? by Pazartzi, Aikaterini
  
Dividends: cause of or cure 
to earnings management? 
 
Aikaterini Pazartzi 
 
 
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION & LEGAL STUDIES 
A thesis submitted for the degree of  
Master of Science (MSc) in International Accounting, Auditing and 
Financial Management 
 
 
 
 
December 2017 
Thessaloniki – Greece 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
Student Name:  Aikaterini Pazartzi 
SID:  1107150024 
Supervisor: Prof. Stergios Leventis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I hereby declare that the work submitted is mine and that where I have made use of 
another’s work, I have attributed the source(s) according to the Regulations set in the 
Student’s Handbook. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 2017 
Thessaloniki - Greece 
 
iii 
 
Abstract 
This dissertation is an endeavour to prove whether dividends act as a motive for 
earnings management or as a weapon in the arsenal of its mitigation. The analysis covers 
a period from 2009 to 2015 and starts with the hypothesis that dividend payers engage 
less in earnings management activities and that this engagement is much larger when 
the pre-managed earnings fail to cover the anticipated dividend levels. After that, the 
effect of investor protection on the relationship between dividend paying status and 
earnings management is examined.  
For the estimation of earnings management three methods are used which are 
discretionary accruals, real earnings management and the probability of earnings 
manipulation, as proposed by the Beneish (1999) model. Based on the results, dividend 
payers actually manage earnings to a smaller scale compared to non-payers. 
Furthermore, it is shown that if the pre-managed earnings of the current year fall below 
the dividends of the previous year, earnings management is observed to a greater 
extent. Last but not least, the examination demonstrates that compared to countries 
with strong investor protection, in countries with weak investor protection, dividend 
paying status is more closely linked to lower levels of discretionary accruals. 
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1. Introduction 
According to IASB conceptual framework the objective of financial statements is 
to provide information regarding the financial position, performance and changes in the 
financial position of an entity to a wide range of users who are interested in making 
economic decisions. If financial statements are compromised, these decisions might be 
negatively affected and result to undesired consequences. Under this notion, IASB states 
that a firm’s financial statements should represent a true and fair view of its position 
and it is therefore essential to possess four major characteristics: relevance, reliability, 
comparability and understandability. However, that is not always the case in the real 
market. Relevance and reliability can be easily compromised by the use of earnings 
management practices. 
Earnings manipulation may have unfavourable effects both for the companies 
contacting it and the market as a whole. For instance, Kothari, Mizik and Roychowdhury 
(2015) state that companies which inflate earnings through real activities manipulation 
prior to SEOs tend to demonstrate negative post-SEO stock return results. On a market-
wide level, Bar-Yosef and Prencipe (2013) suggest that earnings management may 
negatively affect market liquidity. They reason that earnings management degree serves 
as a proxy for earnings quality, therefore, it is positively related to information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Higher levels of earnings management 
result to higher information asymmetry and lower reliability on published accounting 
figures which leads to adverse effects in terms of investors’ uncertainty and market 
liquidity. 
How executives manage earnings has been broadly discussed throughout the 
existing literature. Executing discretion on the accruals and real activities handling are 
considered the two prevailing methods. Graham et al. (2005) interviewed a number of 
executives, with the majority of them being CFOs, and to their surprise they discovered 
that reality contradicts literature which suggests that the majority of earnings 
manipulation is achieved through discretionary accruals. They found that most 
managers tend to prefer real economic actions, most likely because such actions are not 
easily disputed. Especially after major accounting scandals and the introduction of the 
Introduction 
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Sarbanes–Oxley Act1, directors seem more reluctant to jeopardise their credibility by 
exercising even within GAAP accounting discretion. 
Various forces may turn managers towards earnings manipulation. Graham et al. 
(2005) identified beating or meeting specific earnings benchmarks as one major motive 
for earnings management. According to the responses they got in their interviews, 
managers desire to achieve those targets in order to establish credibility with investors 
and lenders, maintain or increase stock price, improve their reputation and 
communicate growth prospects. Furthermore, Healy and Wahlen (1999) suggest that 
three of the main reasons that cause earnings manipulation are analysts’ expectations 
and forecasts, contracts that contain terms based on accounting figures and several 
government regulations.  
Dividend policy can lead to the creation of specific earnings thresholds, as well. 
Kasanen et al. (1995) were amongst the first to provide evidence on the existence of 
dividend based earnings management. Using data on Finnish listed firms, they proved 
that companies manage earnings in order to achieve smooth dividend streams, which 
are anticipated by the large institutional shareholders that dominate the Finnish market. 
On the other hand, several recent studies have proved that dividends can act in fact as 
a remedy to earnings manipulation (Tong and Miao,2011; He et al.,2017). 
The present analysis is an attempt to cast some light on the above conflict. First, 
it is hypothesized that dividend payers engage less in earnings management activities 
and that this engagement is much larger when the pre-managed earnings fail to cover 
the anticipated dividend levels. Next, the effect of investor protection on the 
relationship between dividend paying status and earnings management is examined. La 
Porta et al. (2000) state that investor protection is quite significant given the fact that in 
several countries expropriation of minority shareholders and creditors by the controlling 
shareholders is vast. They link expropriation to the agency problem, which in several 
cases is mitigated by dividend distribution. 
The issues presented above are examined by using company data from 
developed and developing markets, with strong and weak investor protection 
background, covering the period 2009-2015. To proxy for earnings management three 
                                                 
1 US Public Law 107–204, 116 Stat. 745, enacted July 30, 2002. Also known as the "Public Company 
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act". More information at: https://www.sec.gov/ 
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methods are used. First, discretionary accruals are calculated based on the Modified 
Jones model as proposed by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995). After that, real 
activities manipulation is estimated using the Roychowdury (2006) model. In the end, 
the probability of earnings manipulation is calculated using the M-Score model, 
developed by Messod D. Beneish (1999). Although the Beneish model is used by 
practitioners and analysts, its application in the current literature is limited and this work 
hopes to contribute in filling this void.  
The results show that dividend payers manage earnings to a smaller scale 
compared to non-payers. In addition, it is evidenced that if the pre-managed earnings 
of the current year fall below the dividends distributed in the previous year, earnings 
management is observed to a greater extent. Last but not least, investor protection 
characteristics are proven to have some effect on the dividend paying status-earnings 
management relationship. Compared to countries with strong investor protection, in 
countries with weak investor protection, dividend paying status’s link to lower levels of 
discretionary accruals is tighter. 
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows: in Section 2 the basic 
relevant literature on earnings management, dividend policy and the relationship 
between dividends and earnings management is reviewed. Section 3 describes the data 
used in the examination and constructs the models employed. In Section 4 the results 
of the empirical analysis are presented and discussed. Finally, Section 5 concludes the 
analysis, presents its limitations and provides suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Related literature and hypotheses development 
The notion of earnings management has been a subject of conversation for 
several years. As a first step many researchers tried to prove the existence of earnings 
manipulation. Several others attempted to examine and identify the reasons that lead 
to such actions. This section starts with presenting some basic literature relevant to 
earnings management in general. Subsequently, it continues with studies relevant to 
dividend policy and after that it focuses on dividend based earnings manipulation. At 
Related literature and hypotheses development 
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the end of this chapter, the hypotheses that are going to be tested in the present thesis 
are established.  
2.1 Earnings management 
2.1.1 What is earnings management? 
 
 Earnings management takes place when managers exert judgment during 
financial reporting or proceed with transactions in order to modify financial reports with 
the scope of either misinforming stakeholders on the true economic performance of the 
firm or manipulating outcomes that depend on reported accounting figures (Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999).  Roychowdury (2006, pp.337) defines earnings management activities 
as “departures from normal operational practices, motivated by managers’ desire to 
mislead at least some stakeholders into believing certain financial reporting goals have 
been met in the normal course of operations”. Focusing on earnings management’s 
results, Dou et al. (2016) state that by the term they refer to activities implemented by 
management that cause reported earnings not to actually represent the firm’s true 
performance.  
Earnings management is in several cases mistakenly considered a fraudulent 
activity. However, in essence there is a clear difference between the two issues. First 
and foremost, fraud2 is illegal. It can involve, and in most cases involves, earnings 
manipulation but the reverse relationship does not necessarily exist. Dechow and 
Skinner (2000) highlight the above distinction by stating that earnings management 
involves activities that fall under the spectrum of GAAP regulations whereas fraud by 
definition violates GAAP.  
2.1.2 Accrual-based and real activities earnings management 
 
Literature extensively proposes two paths through which earnings management 
can be implemented: discretionary accruals and real activities manipulation. In the first 
case, managers take advantage of the fact that a part of the total accruals lies upon their 
                                                 
2 The intentional, deliberate, misstatement or omission of material facts, or accounting data, which is 
misleading and, when considered with all the information made available, would cause the reader to 
change or alter his or her judgment or decision. (National Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 1993, 
12) 
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discretion and interfere with the financial reporting process by exerting judgment as far 
as accounting choices and policies are concerned (Kothari et al., 2015). Real activities 
earnings management is essentially described in the definition proposed by 
Roychowdury (2006) already stated above. In his relevant paper he tested three 
earnings management methods that involve sales manipulation, reducing discretionary 
expenditures and the reduction of cost of goods sold through overproduction. McVay 
(2006), however, proposed a third road that managers can follow in order to manipulate 
earnings and that is through “classification shifting”.  She states that managers 
deliberately misclassify expenses within the income statement, for instance they pose a 
portion of core operating expenses as special items. Such actions can affect how 
interested parties view the financial statements, given the fact that different 
classifications hold different information and investors seem to take that into 
consideration. 
Accruals and real earnings management differ in many ways. A key distinction 
between them derives from the fact that accruals are highly regulated by the GAAP 
whereas no such framework exists for real operations. As a result, accrual earnings 
management is more easily detected than real activities manipulation and therefore the 
latter is preferable in an environment where accounting practices are subject to closer 
inspection (Kothari et al., 2015). Accruals, however, are easier to handle since they can 
be manipulated after the end of each fiscal year, should the need of earnings 
management appear, whereas on the other the hand real activities must be executed 
prior to the year-end (Shust, 2015). It is proven, however, that an interactive relationship 
exists between the two earnings manipulation techniques. Matsuura (2008) 
demonstrated that managers use accruals and real earnings management in a 
complementary way and that in most cases manipulating real activities precedes 
accruals.  
2.1.3 Reported facts behind earnings management 
 
 External factors, like the industry the company operates in or the effective 
regulatory regime, have been proven to have some effect to the degree of earnings 
manipulation. Several industries present higher proclivity than others towards managing 
earnings. For instance, Shust (2015) proved that executives of R&D firms are more prone 
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to earnings smoothing than those of firms that operate in a different field. Furthermore, 
Kedia, Koh and Rajgopal (2015) found proof on the existence of mimetic earnings 
management within peer firms. In other words companies get involved in earnings 
manipulation after an announcement of earnings restatement by target firms in their 
industry. From a regulatory point of view, Hossain et al. (2011) associated the 
establishment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act with lower levels of accruals manipulation, as 
it possibly resulted to better governance activities. Leventis, Dimitropoulos and 
Anandarajan (2011), by examining the case of EU commercial banks, indicate that the 
latter engage in earnings management activities through the use of loan loss provisions 
to a significantly smaller scale after the application of IFRS.   
Governance characteristics and board composition play a crucial role in earnings 
management activities, as well. Companies with audit committees that contact frequent 
meetings and their boards include members with financial expertise, have been proved 
to be associated with managing earnings to a smaller scale than others. Moreover, 
directors’ independence is positively related to lower levels of earnings management 
(Xie et al., 2003; Jaggi et al., 2009). Cheng et al. (2016) examined the relationship 
between key subordinate executives and real earnings management. They proxied 
effective governance with both executives’ decision horizon and influence, and found 
that both of these two measures are negatively associated with the level of real earnings 
management. Another study conducted by Chen et al. (2015) demonstrates a positive 
relationship between the appointment of interim CEOs and the extent of “income-
increasing earnings management” since better firm performance improves their 
promotion prospects to a permanent position.  
Ownership structure’s relationship with earnings management activities has also 
been under investigation. Dou, Hope, Thomas and Zou (2016) provided evidence that 
large shareholders take advantage of managers’ discretion in financial reporting and use 
their influence to force them in manipulating the accounting figures to their benefit. 
Thus, a positive relationship exists between the presence of blockholders in a firm and 
earnings manipulation. Family ownership, which in most cases leads to family control, 
has been proven by Jaggi, Leung and Gul (2009) to have a negative effect in earnings 
management mitigation. 
Related literature and hypotheses development 
13 
 
Another interesting topic studied is the auditors’ role as far as earnings 
management is concerned. Krishnan (2003) suggests that firms which employ a Big 6 
auditor with expertise on their industry are associated with lower levels of discretionary 
accruals, thus less earnings manipulation and improved earnings quality. Furthermore, 
Kim et al. (2003) state, test and provide evidence that Big 6 auditors have incentives -
related to potential litigation costs- to be more efficient in detecting upward earnings 
management. They suggest that non-Big 6 auditors are, in fact, better in uncovering 
downward earnings management activities than their Big 6 rivals.  Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2011) analyzed auditing and earnings management from a different scope. 
They examined the relationship between earnings management and auditor-provided 
tax services and concluded that auditor-provided tax services seem to mitigate specific 
earnings manipulation activities.  
2.1.4 Motives behind earnings manipulation 
The motives behind earnings management activities have been an extensive 
matter of discussion. Throughout the existing literature several factors are identified as 
causes of earnings manipulation including, for instance, meeting analysts’ expectations, 
serving the managements’ personal agenda, lending contract motivations, political and 
regulatory reasons. A brief analysis of some of these factors follows. 
Managers tend to inflate earnings prior to attempts of raising capital. IPOs and 
SEOs have been proven to be driving forces of earnings manipulation (Teoh et al., 1998;  
Kim and Park, 2005; Cecchini et al., 2012) with the regulatory setting influencing real 
and accrual earnings management (Alhadab et al., 2016). Pae and Quinn (2011) give 
proof that bond issuers, as well, are more likely to manipulate earnings during the year 
of the issuance compared to non-issuers.  
Debt-covenant restrictions could also lead to earnings manipulation. Violating a 
debt-covenant indicates top management’s inadequacy and in several cases may lead 
to their removal. Naturally, it is in the management’s best interests to manipulate 
earnings upwards in order to avoid the violation or downwards when the violation is 
inevitable in order to negotiate better terms (Jha, 2013). 
Cheng and Warfield (2005) suggest that managers’ stock-based compensation 
and ownership can act as earnings management causes, since the manipulation can 
Related literature and hypotheses development 
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have a positive short term effect on the price of the stocks they are going to sell in the 
future. Laux and Laux (2009), however, provided mixed results on the matter of 
performance based compensation’s relationship with earnings management. They state 
that although managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings tend to have a positive 
relationship with the extent to which their reimbursement is linked to results, at the 
same time the audit committee’s motivation to better monitor the accounting process 
increases as well. As a result of these two contradicting forces, the level of earnings 
management can either expand or contract relative to CEO incentive pay. 
Sawicki and Shrestha (2014) propose that since managers of undervalued firms 
constitute net buyers of the firm’s stock and managers of overvalued firms are net 
sellers, insider trading motives arise that lead to accrual-based earnings management in 
both cases. Overvaluation of a stock can also lead to earnings manipulation, because 
managers in most cases cannot otherwise achieve the necessary earnings levels to 
sustain the overvalued stock price (Badertscher, 2011). 
 The effective tax regime consists one more key factor which can turn 
management towards earnings manipulation. Guenther (1994) found evidence that US 
firms manipulated earnings downwards the year prior to the enactment of the 1986 Tax 
Reform Act3 that decreased the corporate income tax rate. Similarly, Lin, Lu and Zhang 
(2012) report that Chinese firms deflated earnings during 2007 in anticipation of the 
launch of the New Enterprise Income Tax Law (NEIT Law) in 2008, which would allow 
them to be taxed at a lower tax rate4, as well.  
 Last but not least, dividend smoothing and expected dividend thresholds have 
been identified by several studies as important driving forces for managing earnings. 
Besides Kasanen et al. (1995), Liu and Espahbodi (2014) have also examined dividend 
smoothing via earnings manipulation, both from the scope of accrual as well as real 
activities choices. Their results suggested that dividend payers engage more in earnings 
smoothing activities than non-payers.  
                                                 
3 The US congress passed the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (effective for taxable years beginning on or after 1 
July 1987) that decreased the statutory corporate income tax rate from 46% to 34%.  
4 The New Enterprise Income Tax Law in China came into effect in 2008 and altered the corporate income 
tax rate from 33% to 25%. 
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2.2 Dividend policy 
Dividends represent the board of directors’ decision to distribute a portion of the 
company’s earnings back to its shareholders. Many studies have attempted to explain 
how a firm constructs its payout policy and how this policy is associated with various 
external and internal factors.   
Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2005) interviewed several managers on 
their aspects and motives behind the payout policies of their firms. Their results indicate 
that dividend payers are not willing to cut the current payout levels because this would 
lead to several market penalties. The aforementioned dividend inflexibility leads non-
payers to being reluctant to initiate payments at all. In addition to this, the authors 
suggest that companies may pay dividends in order to attract investors, such as retail 
investors or institutions, who generally favour them. They summarized their findings in 
six main “rules of thumb” which managers tend to follow when constructing their 
payout policy; avoid dividend cuts with respect to their adverse consequences, follow 
the competition norm, have good credit ratings, have a variety of different investors, 
preserve flexibility and try not to take decisions that negatively affect EPS. 
The level of payout has also been associated with the managerial entrenchment 
theory. Hu and Kumar (2004) predicted and proved that the probability and the extent 
of payout is positively related to factors that contribute to the increase of managerial 
entrenchment levels. They suggest that, ceteris paribus, executives who are more 
probable to take inadequate decisions can be more easily disciplined by outsiders who 
prefer higher payouts. 
La Porta et al. (2000) linked potential agency problems to dividend distribution 
based on two models, the “outcome model” and the “substitute model”. In the first case, 
minority shareholders use their legal rights -under an effective system of investor 
protection- in order to compel managers to distribute earnings and therefore prevent 
them from using additional cash to their own personal benefit. Thus, dividends are an 
outcome of investors’ efficient legal protection. In the second case, however, dividends 
constitute a substitute for legal protection. In an environment characterized by poor 
investor protection and inadequate capital markets, firms pay dividends in order to 
minimize expropriation opportunities, mitigate agency concerns, establish a credible 
Related literature and hypotheses development 
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reputation and consequently get easier access to funds. After examining the above 
theories both in common and civil law countries, the writers came up with strong 
evidence in support of the “outcome model”. 
Stock market liquidity has also been associated with dividend payments. It is 
stated by Banerjee, Gatchev and Spindt (2007) that in illiquid markets investors’ demand 
for cash increases and they claim a larger amount of dividend payments. In highly liquid 
markets however, firms with more liquid stocks are less motivated to distribute cash 
back to their shareholders and vice versa.  
Shareholders’ individual taxes affect a company’s payout policy, as well. As the 
difference between the marginal tax rate on dividend income and the marginal tax rate 
on capital gains increases, firms are more likely to prefer stock repurchases to dividends 
in order to distribute cash back to their shareholders (Moser, 2007).  
Several companies may choose not to distribute dividends at all. Baker et al. 
(2012), after interviewing executives of Canadian non-dividend-paying listed firms, 
identified growth opportunities, low profitability and cash limitations as key reasons 
that can lead Canadian firms’ not to pay dividends. 
2.3 Dividends and earnings management  
It is evident by the above analysis that managers engage in earnings 
manipulation activities when they want to achieve specific target thresholds. The 
conservative and inflexible nature of dividends may lead to the creation of such desired 
thresholds.  
First and foremost, managers tend to manipulate earnings in order to avoid 
cutting the level of dividends paid in the prior year. Bennett and Bradbury (2007) 
examined data on listed firms in the New Zealand and introduced a new earnings 
threshold, the dividend-cover threshold. They compared their results before and after 
changes in the financial reporting regime and suggested that an earnings threshold 
related to dividend cover is likely to be relevant in jurisdictions with high dividend 
payouts and where the law mandates that dividends must be paid out of profits. 
Specific dividend targets can also be a result of the inclusion of dividend 
restrictions in debt covenants. By employing data from the USA, Daniel et al. (2008) 
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tested and eventually accepted the hypothesis that firms manage earnings upwards 
when they observe a deficit between the ‘pre-managed’ earnings and the target 
dividend level required by their investors and these covenants.  
Taking the above research a step further, Atieh and Hussain (2012) investigated 
whether UK firms manage earnings when the latter fall below expected dividend 
thresholds in the case of dividend paying firms and when managers aim to avoid 
reporting losses in the case of dividend non-paying firms. They reached to the conclusion 
that in the UK earnings management is mostly conducted by dividend payers when they 
fail to meet their dividend targets rather than by non-payers who want to avoid losses. 
Dividend non-paying firms still manage earnings but this was observed on a smaller 
scale. 
Tong and Miao (2011), provided different results in their attempt to test the 
relationship between dividends and earnings quality, which they proxied by 
discretionary accruals. In their examination on data by the US market, dividend payers 
seem to be associated with lower levels of discretionary accruals than non-payers. In 
fact, they suggest that the size of the payment is significant as well and higher payout 
ratios prove to be related to significantly lower levels of discretionary accruals.  
Consistent with Tong and Miao (2011), He et al. (2017) also supported the idea 
that dividend paying status is related to lower levels of discretionary accruals. In their 
attempt to shed some light on the relationship between dividend paying status and 
earnings manipulation they took into consideration the differences across markets as 
far as investor protection and transparency are concerned. By using a sample of 23,429 
corporations from 29 countries they reached to the conclusion that dividend payers 
manage earnings to a smaller scale than dividend non-payers.  
2.4 Hypotheses Development 
 As outlined above, literature provides mixed results on how dividends affect 
management’s decision to manipulate earnings. Some authors suggest that dividends 
are associated with higher levels of earnings management while others support the 
opposite view. If La Porta’s et al. (2000) “outcome model” holds, then dividends are 
indeed an outcome of investors’ efficient legal protection and taking into account that 
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protection they should contribute to earnings management mitigation.  Therefore, by 
considering only the dividend paying status and not the magnitude of the payment, the 
first hypothesis lines up with the results of Tong and Miao (2011) and He et al. (2017) 
and it is formed as follows: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Compared to non-payers, dividend payers are associated with 
lower levels of earnings management. 
 Dividends’ inflexibility creates specific desired earnings targets. Daniel et al. 
(2008) proposed the “Deficit Model”. According to this model unless the “pre-managed” 
earnings cover the target dividend threshold, which is proxied by the dividends of the 
previous year, then a deficit is observed.  If the desired dividend level is covered, then 
the deficit is zero.  A positive deficit is associated with higher levels of discretionary 
accruals. Consequently, the second hypothesis is stated as: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Firms engage in earnings management activities to a greater 
extend if the pre-managed earnings of year t do not cover the dividends of year t-1. 
As already mentioned above, He et al.(2017) suggest that dividend payers 
manage earnings to a smaller scale than dividend non-payers. They also note that such 
evidence is stronger in countries with weak investor protection, weak institutions and 
low transparency, where dividend policy is used in order to mitigate agency problems.  
If the profits are not distributed back to the shareholders, they may be exploited by 
managers for personal gain. Companies can adopt dividend policies associated with 
lower levels of earnings management in order to tackle agency concerns and develop 
credible reputation. Essentially their results support the “substitute model” already 
mentioned above. The final hypothesis to be tested is: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Compared to countries with strong investor protection, in 
countries with weak investor protection, dividend paying status is more closely 
associated with lower levels of earnings management. 
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3. Data description and methodology 
The purpose of this thesis is to shed more light on the relationship between 
dividends and earnings manipulation. In this attempt the development of statistical 
models and tests on actual financial data is essential. The characteristics of these data 
and the methods used to analyse them are explained in this section. 
3.1 Sample  
All the necessary financial information for the analysis has been downloaded 
from the Bloomberg Database. The sample consists of a number of firms that operate in 
different countries and belong to a variety of sectors, which are listed in Table 1. It is 
limited to companies with sufficient annual data to calculate the variables needed for 
the computations of the models.  
The sectors presented on the following table are based on the Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS) system. The system was developed in 1999 by MSCI Inc.5 
and Standard & Poor's (S&P) and includes 11 sectors, 8 of which are included in the 
present analysis. Regulated industries, meaning financial firms and utilities, are excluded 
from the examination. 
Table 1 
Distribution of observations by sector 
Industry Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Consumer Discretionary 658 18.73 18.73 
Consumer Staples 350 9.96 28.69 
Energy 336 9.56 38.25 
Health Care 504 14.34 52.59 
Industrials 553 15.74 68.33 
Information Technology 469 13.35 81.67 
Materials 504 14.34 96.02 
Telecommunication Services 140 3.98 100.00 
Total 3,514 100.00  
 
                                                 
5 Formerly Morgan Stanley Capital International and MSCI Barra 
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The initial sample consists of 503 entities covering the period from 2009 to 2015, 
leading to 3514 firm-year observations from 23 countries including Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom and the United States.  In order to test the 
differences in the investor protection environment between the above countries, 
several indices are used from the World Bank database that is available online6. The 
distinction between common and civil law was based on information provided on the 
website7 of the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States. 
3.2 Main variable construction 
3.2.1 Earnings management variables 
The present analysis employs three key metrics of earnings management which 
are the discretionary accruals, real earnings management and the probability of 
earnings manipulation. Total discretionary accruals are calculated following the 
Modified Jones Model proposed by Dechow et al. (1995) according to which abnormal 
accruals are the residual from a regression of total accruals onto the reciprocal of lagged 
total assets, the change in revenues minus the change in accounts receivable and the 
level of property, plant and equipment, all scaled by lagged total assets. The regression 
is estimated separately for each sector and year:  
 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
=  𝛼0 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛼1 (
𝛥𝑆𝑡 − 𝛥𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
) +  𝛼2 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 (1) 
 
where: TACC = total accruals, defined as net income minus cash flow from operations ; 
A= total assets; ΔS= the change in revenues; ΔREC = the change in accounts receivable; 
PPE = property, plant and equipment; DACC= discretionary accruals; α0 to α3 are the 
coefficients estimated by the regression. 
Real earnings management is estimated following the Roychowdury model 
(2006). Roychowdury uses three measures of real activities manipulation which are 
                                                 
6 http://databank.worldbank.org 
7 https://www.cia.gov/library 
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abnormal cash flow from operations (AB_CFO), abnormal production costs (AB_PROD) 
and abnormal discretionary expenditures (AB_EXP). AB_CFO, AB_PROD and AB_EXP are 
the residuals of the following three equations respectively: 
 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
=  𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛼2 (
𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
) +  𝛼3 (
𝛥𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑡 (2) 
 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
=  𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛼2 (
𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛼3 (
𝛥𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛼4 (
𝛥𝑆𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
) +  𝜀𝑡 (3) 
 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
=  𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛼2 (
𝑆𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
) +  𝜀𝑡 (4) 
where:  CFO = cash flow from operations; A= total assets; S = revenue; ΔS = the change 
in revenue; PROD = production costs; ΔS = the change in revenue DISEXP = discretionary 
expenditures which include R&D, Advertising and Sales, General and Administrative 
costs; α0 to α4 are the coefficients estimated by the regressions.  
 Equations (2) to (4) are estimated for every sector and year apart and real 
earnings manipulation (REM) is calculated as: 
 𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑡 =  𝐴𝐵_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 − 𝐴𝐵_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡 + 𝐴𝐵_𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡   (5) 
 The probability of earnings manipulation is estimated using the M-Score as 
proposed by Messod D. Beneish (1999). Beneish in his corresponding study develops a 
model that distinguishes manipulated from non-manipulated reported accounting 
figures. The model involves the estimation of eight variables8 which are Days Sales in 
Receivables Index (DSRI), Gross Margin Index (GMI), Asset Quality Index (AQI), Sales 
Growth Index (SGI), Depreciation Index (DEPI), Sales General and Administrative 
Expenses Index (SGAI), Leverage Index (LVGI) and Total Accruals to Total Assets (TATA). 
An M-Score, which determines the probability of earnings manipulation, is calculated 
based on the following equation: 
 
𝑀_𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =  −4.840 + 0.920 ∗ 𝐷𝑆𝑅𝐼 + 0.528 ∗ 𝐺𝑀𝐼 + 0.404 ∗ 𝐴𝑄𝐼
+ 0.892 ∗ 𝑆𝐺𝐼 + 0.115 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐼 − 0.172 ∗ 𝑆𝐺𝐴𝐼 + 4.670
∗ 𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐴 − 0.327 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐼 
(6) 
                                                 
8 For the calculation of the variables see Beneish, M.D. (1999). The detection of earnings manipulation. 
Financial Analysts Journal, 55(5), pp. 24-36 
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An M-Score greater than -1.78 indicates a higher than acceptable probability of earnings 
manipulation. Therefore, the M-Score is calculated for every firm and firm year in the 
sample and a binary variable BEN is constructed as follows: 
BEN = 1, if M_Score > -1.78 (high probability of earnings manipulation) 
BEN = 0, if M_Score < -1.78 (low probability of earnings manipulation) 
3.2.2 Dividend variables 
In order to proxy for the dividend policy three variables are formed, as well. The 
first variable is DIV_PAYER. DIV_PAYER is a binary variable that takes the value of 1, if 
the firm paid dividends in the previous year and 0, if the firm did not pay any dividend 
in the previous year. The second variable is DEFICIT, which is a modified version of the 
one proposed by Daniel et al. (2008) in their “Deficit Model”.  DEFICIT here takes the 
value of Max(0, earnings shortfall), as well. However, in our case earnings shortfall is 
calculated as expected dividends of the previous year minus pre-managed earnings9, 
scaled by total assets. The last variable is DIV_LEV and captures the level of the payment. 
DIV_LEV is calculated as dividends scaled by total assets.  
3.3  Model construction 
To capture the relation between earnings management and dividends and test 
hypotheses H1 and H2, the following basic models are estimated: 
 
 
𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝐼𝑉_𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐼𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑡 +  𝛼3𝐷𝐼𝑉_𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡−1
+ 𝛼4𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑡
+ 𝛼8𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛼9𝐸𝑂𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 + +𝛼11𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
(7) 
 
 
 
𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝐼𝑉_𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐼𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑡 +  𝛼3𝐷𝐼𝑉_𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡−1
+ 𝛼4𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑡
+ 𝛼8𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛼9𝐸𝑂𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 + +𝛼11𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
(8) 
 
 
                                                 
9 Pre-managed earnings are defined as cash flow from operations plus non-discretionary total accruals. 
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Pr (𝐵𝐸𝑁 = 1) =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝐼𝑉_𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐼𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑡 +  𝛼3𝐷𝐼𝑉_𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡−1
+ 𝛼4𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑡
+ 𝛼7𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑡 + 𝛼9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛼10𝐸𝑂𝑡
+ 𝛼11𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛼12𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
(9) 
where:  ABS_DACC = the absolute value of discretionary accruals; ABS_REM= the 
absolute value of real earnings management; BEN = 1, if the firm has a higher than 
acceptable probability of earnings manipulation (M_Score > -1.78) and 0 otherwise 
(M_Score < -1.78); DIV_PAYER = 1, if the firm paid dividends in the previous year and 0, 
if the firm did not pay any dividend in the previous year; DEFICIT = Max(0, earnings 
shortfall); DIV_LEV= the ratio of dividends to total assets; OWNER= the percentage of 
shares held by insiders; GOVERN= the percentage of independent directors on the 
board; BIG4= 1, if the firm is audited by one of the Big4 auditing firms and 0, otherwise; 
LEVER= the ratio of long term debt to total assets; EO= 1, if the firm’s equity has risen in 
the following year, and 0 otherwise; SIZE= the ratio of market capitalization to total 
assets; TAX= total tax rate on profits; α0 to α11 are the coefficients estimated by the 
regressions. 
Equations (7) and (8) are estimated with multiple linear regressions and equation 
(9) with a logistic regression. DIV_PAYER, DEFICIT and DIV_LEV are the main variables of 
the two models.  Because accruals and real manipulation can be used simultaneously or 
as substitutes for each other, testing only the one type of earnings management 
activities might not possibly lead to accurate results (Zang, 2011). To control for this 
effect between the two earnings management methods, ABS_REM is included as a 
control variable in the discretionary accruals regression and ABS_DACC as a control 
variable in the real activities manipulation regression.  
García‐Meca and Sánchez‐Ballesta (2009) have studied the dynamics between 
corporate governance and earnings management. They showed that independent 
boards are proven to be more effective in earnings management mitigation but they 
failed to find a statistically significant relationship between managerial ownership and 
earnings management. However, their results indicated a significant relationship when 
only board ownership is examined. Contrary to Cheng and Warfield (2005), Gabrielsen 
et al. (2002) find a positive relationship between the magnitude of discretionary accruals 
and managerial ownership under a Danish setting. Either way, ownership and board 
Data description and methodology 
24 
 
independence appear to affect earnings manipulation decisions and as a result they are 
included as control variables in the present models.  
In line with Krishnan (2003), Becker et al (1998) identify audit by one of the Big6 
auditing firms as a potential weapon in the arsenal of earnings management mitigation. 
Consequently, a binary control variable representing the presence of a Big4 auditor 
becomes a part of this examination. As per previous literature, leverage (Jelinek, 2007), 
equity offerings (Teoh et al., 1998; Kim and Park, 2005; Cecchini et al., 2012), size (Kim 
and Rhee, 2003) and tax rate (Guenther, 1994; Lin et al, 2012) also consist control 
variables of this study. 
Hypothesis H3 is tested by examining the interaction between dividends, 
earnings management and the degree of investor protection. In this attempt a binary 
variable IP, which represents investor protection, is constructed as follows. As a first 
step an IP-Score is estimated as a sum of the grade a country gets in the Extent of 
director liability index (EDL), the Strength of investor protection index (SIP), the Extent 
of corporate transparency index (ECT), the Depth of credit information index (DCI), the 
Strength of legal rights index (SLR) and the Law index (LAW)10, as proposed by the World 
Bank. The maximum possible IP-Score that can be achieved is 5011. It is assumed that if 
the score is above 70%, or in other words above 35, investor protection is considered 
strong and if it is below 35, weak. Therefore, the IP-Score is estimated for every firm and 
firm year in the sample and the binary variable IP is: 
IP = 1, if IP-Score < 35 (weak protection) 
IP = 0, if IP-Score > 35 (strong protection) 
The models to test hypothesis H3 become: 
 
𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝐼𝑉_𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑃𝑡 +  𝛼3𝐷𝐼𝑉_𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐸𝑅 ∗  𝐼𝑃𝑡
+ 𝛼4𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑡
+ 𝛼8𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛼9𝐸𝑂𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 + +𝛼11𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
(10) 
 
 
𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝐼𝑉_𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑃𝑡 +  𝛼3𝐷𝐼𝑉_𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐸𝑅 ∗  𝐼𝑃𝑡
+ 𝛼4𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑡
+ 𝛼8𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛼9𝐸𝑂𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 + +𝛼11𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
(11) 
                                                 
10 A detailed explanation of the above indices can be found in the appendix.  
11 Explained in detail in the appendix 
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where:  ABS_DACC = the absolute value of discretionary accruals; ABS_REM= the 
absolute value of real earnings management; IP = 1, if the firm operates in a country 
with weak investor protection (IP-Score < 35) and 0 when the investor protection is 
strong (IP-Score > 35); DIV_PAYER = 1, if the firm paid dividends in the previous year and 
0, if the firm did not pay any dividend in the previous year; OWNER= the percentage of 
shares held by insiders; GOVERN= the percentage of independent directors on the 
board; BIG4= 1, if the firm is audited by one of the Big4 auditing firms and 0, otherwise; 
LEVER= the ratio of long term debt to total assets; EO= 1, if the firm’s equity has risen in 
the following year, and 0 otherwise; SIZE= the ratio of market capitalization to total 
assets; TAX= total tax rate on profits; α0 to α11 are the coefficients estimated by the 
regressions. 
 
4. Empirical results 
This chapter presents the empirical results of the analysis. First, some basic 
descriptive statistics are commented. After that, the estimation of the models follows 
and at the end the results of the hypotheses testing are analyzed. The statistical 
software used throughout this process is Stata 13.1. 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
As a first step of the analysis, the proxies for earnings management for each year 
are estimated. More specifically total discretionary accruals, real earnings management 
and the M-Score, in order to construct the BEN variable, are calculated. The results are 
corrected for outliers by winsorizing at 1% and 99% level.  
The figures below present the histograms of the three earnings management 
measures before and after winsorizing.  The winsorizing process is quite important since 
individual outliers can ruin the models and compromise the results. 
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Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the continuous variables and Table 3 
the summary statistics of the binary variables of the examination. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables 
Variables Mean Median Minimum Maximum St.Dev. p25 p75 Observ. 
DACC -0.0067 -0.0062 -0.1693 0.1458 0.0483 -0.0292 0.0171 2,510 
REM -0.0018 -0.0236 -0.6276 1.0066 0.2801 -0.1638 0.1234 2,510 
DEFICIT 0.0057 0.0000 0.0000 1.3163 0.0431 0.0000 0 2,510 
DIV_LEV  0.0276 0.0178 0.6301 0.0000 0.0376 0.0355 0.0051 3,514 
OWNER 0.2266 0.1077 0.0000 0.9989 0.2532 0.0256 0.3584 3,514 
GOVERN 0.8679 0.9000 0.0000 1.0000 0.1016 0.8333 0.9167 3,514 
LEVER 0.8094 0.1920 0.0000 34.9412 4.2269 0.1009 0.2819 3,514 
SIZE 2.0805 1.4352 0.2002 10.5675 1.9380 0.8347 2.6977 3,514 
TAX 0.4318 0.4600 0.1990 0.6850 0.0957 0.4230 0.4650 3,514 
Notes: The table presents the descriptive statistics of the continuous variables of the sample which 
includes 503 firms for the period 2009-2015. DACC and REM are the dependent variables, DEFICIT and 
DIV_LEV are the main variables and OWNER, GOVERN, LEVER, SIZE, TAX consist some control variables.  
 
The average value of the discretionary accruals is -0.0067 and the average value 
of real earnings management is -0.0018. The negative average values of the two 
earnings management proxies indicate that companies engage more in earnings 
manipulation activities in order to understate earnings. That claim could potentially 
have some merit if the average tax rate is taken into account which is quite high at 
43.18%. The mean of the deficit is 0.0057 and the mean dividend level is 0.0276, or in 
other words for the present sample dividends are on average 3% of total assets. The 
sample also appears to be quite leveraged, with the average long term debt to total 
assets ratio reaching 80.94%. 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics of the binary variables 
Variables Mean St.Dev. Minimum Maximum Observ. 
DIV_PAYER 0.7955 0.4034 0 1 3,012 
BIG4 0.9602 0.1956 0 1 3,514 
EO 0.6884 0.4632 0 1 3,514 
BEN 0.1938 0.3953 0 1 3,514 
IP 0.3139 0.4641 0 1 3,514 
Notes: The table presents the descriptive statistics of the binary variables of the sample which includes 
503 firms for the period 2009-2015. BEN is a dependent variable, DIV_PAYER is a main variable and 
BIG4, EO and IP consist some control variables. 
 
Dividend payers consist 79.55% of the whole sample and 96.02% of the sample 
employ a Big4 auditor. Equity offerings were quite usual (68.84%) and a fair percent of 
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the companies under investigation (19.38%) are potential suspects of manipulating their 
earnings. Considering that the majority of the entities under examination reside in the 
USA or in the UK, only 31.39% of the sample operates in a weak investor protection 
environment.  
 For all of the continuous variables of the sample Spearman correlations are 
estimated and the results are presented in Table 4.  Since the existence and the level 
and not the direction of earnings manipulation are the object of the present study, the 
absolute values of DACC and REM are included in the estimation of the correlations and 
in the final models. The interrelation between discretionary accruals and real earnings 
management is evident here again. The two earnings management proxies are 
significantly positively related with the corresponding coefficient taking the value of 
0.0688.  Discretionary accruals are also significantly positively correlated with the 
dividend level, the deficit, the percentage of insider ownership and negatively correlated 
with the percentage of independent directors and the tax rate.  Real earnings 
management is significantly positively correlated with the dividend level, the deficit, the 
size of the firm and negatively correlated with the percentage of independent directors 
and the leverage. 
 
Table 4 
Spearman rank correlations for the continuous variables 
  
ABS_ 
DACC 
ABS_ 
REM DIV_LEV DEFICIT OWNER GOVERN LEVER SIZE TAX 
ABS_ 
DACC 
1         
ABS_ 
REM 
0.0688* 1        
DIV_LEV 0.1024* 0.0438* 1       
DEFICIT 0.2405* -0.0392* 0.2051* 1      
OWNER 0.0712* -0.0093 0.0112 0.0414* 1     
GOVERN -0.0925* -0.0566* -0.0469* -0.0281 -0.0586* 1    
LEVER 0.0194 -0.1470* 0.0184 0.0835* 0.0798* 0.0648* 1   
SIZE 0.0234 0.1714* -0.1979* -0.1369* 0.0409* -0.0437* -0.2256* 1  
TAX -0.0409* 0.0088 0.0437* -0.0563* -0.1083* 0.0836* -0.0047 -0.0086 1 
Notes: The table presents the Spearman correlations for all the continuous variables of the estimation. 
The coefficients with an asterisk (*) are significant at a 5% level.  
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4.2 Model estimation 
4.2.1 Testing hypotheses H1 and H2 
In this part of the analysis, the models constructed earlier are applied to the 
available dataset in order to test the hypotheses developed.  As already mentioned 
before, equations (7) and (8) are estimated using linear regression and equation (9) is 
estimated using logistic regression. Table 5 presents the regression results of the 
equations (7) through (9) that have been established in order to test hypotheses H1 and 
H2. In the three columns the numbers represent the coefficients of each variable in the 
model and the numbers in parentheses are the p-values of the regression results. The 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level is demonstrated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
Table 5 
Regression results for hypotheses H1 and H2 
Dependent  ABS_DACC ABS_REM BEN 
Variable (Equation 7) (Equation 8) (Equation 9) 
Explanatory variables       
DIV_PAYER -0.0096*** -0.0207* -0.8493*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0550) (0.0001) 
DEFICIT 0.2634*** -0.2253** -2.0701 
 (0.0001) (0.0300) (0.3398) 
DIV_LEV -0.0177 -0.5886*** 1.7087 
 (0.5240) (0.0003) (0.6070) 
ABS_REM 0.0118***  -0.2209 
 (0.0016)  (0.6496) 
OWNER 0.0044* -0.0049 -0.3108 
 (0.0869) (0.7471) (0.4195) 
GOVERN -0.0177*** -0.1945*** -1.6026** 
 (0.0050) (0.0000) (0.0157) 
BIG4 0.0008 0.0234 ommitted 
 (0.8111) (0.2552)  
LEVER 0.0002* -0.0067*** -0.0514** 
 (0.0997) (0.0000) (0.0383) 
EO -0.0016 0.0223*** 0.7222*** 
 (0.2602) (0.0031) (0.0016) 
SIZE 0.0014*** 0.0202*** -0.0491 
 (0.0064) (0.0000) (0.3116) 
TAX -0.0239*** 0.0541 -0.7741 
 (0.0002) (0.1001) (0.4472) 
ABS_DACC  0.3979*** 14.6301*** 
  (0.0018) (0.0000) 
Constant 0.0596*** 0.2644*** -1.2849* 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0977) 
Observations 2,510 2,510 2,410 
R-squared 0.1592 0.1067  
Pseudo R-squared     0.0883 
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P-values in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
Notes: The table reports the results of the three regressions using as dependent variables the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals, the absolute value of real earnings management and the dummy 
variable representing the Beneish probability of earnings manipulation. The sample consists of 503 
entities, examined for the period 2009-2015.  The models estimated are, for all specifications: 
Earnings management proxy = f(x), where x are the variables related to each specification. The numbers 
in parenthesis are the values of the test statistic. ***, ** and * show the significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively. All numbers are rounded up to the forth decimal place. 
 
In all of the above model specifications it is observed that a statistically 
significant relationship exists between dividend policy and earnings management. 
Discretionary accruals are negatively related to dividend paying status, as the 
corresponding coefficient (-0.0096) suggests. At the same time, as the deficit increases 
the absolute value of discretionary accruals increases, as well.  The level of the payment 
is not statistically significant in the case of discretionary accruals. As expected, real 
earnings management presents a positive significant relationship with discretionary 
accruals.  Furthermore, the results indicate that higher levels of insider ownership 
encourage accruals manipulation whereas higher director independence contributes to 
earnings manipulation mitigation.  Larger companies seem to be related to greater levels 
of discretionary accruals and higher tax rate here is negatively related to accrual 
manipulation. 
All three proxies for dividend policy are statistically significant in the case of real 
activities manipulation. However the level of significance differs between the three 
regressors. The dividend paying status (DIV_PAYER) is significant at 10%, DEFICIT is 
significant at 5% and the level of the payment (DIV_LEV) is significant at 1%. Basically, 
greater dividend payouts are proven to be associated with lower levels of real earnings 
management. Larger firms are linked to higher levels of real activities manipulation, as 
well, and leverage and equity offerings also appear to be statistically significant in this 
case.  
The results of the third regression, in which the Beneish probability of earnings 
manipulation is used as the predicted variable, support those of the two models above. 
The negative coefficient of DIV_PAYER (-0.8493) indicates that dividend payers are less 
probable to manage earnings than non-payers. Naturally, the coefficient of discretionary 
accruals is quite large (14.6301) validating the theory which states that higher values of 
discretionary accruals must indicate higher probability of earnings management. Higher 
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percentages of outside directors and leverage appear to decrease the probability of 
earnings management whereas more equity offerings seem to enhance it.  
4.2.2 Testing hypothesis H3 
For examining the hypothesis H3 equations (10) and (11) are estimated using 
linear regression. In Table 6 the regression results of equations (10) and (11) are 
presented. In the two columns the numbers represent the coefficients of each variable 
in the model and the numbers in parentheses are the p-values of the test. The 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level is demonstrated by ***, ** and *, respectively, 
once more. 
Table 6 
Regression results for hypothesis H3 
Dependent ABS_DACC ABS_REM 
Variable (Equation 10) (Equation 11) 
Explanatory variables     
DIV_PAYER -0.0098*** -0.0010 
 (0.0000) (0.9309) 
IP 0.0179*** -0.0155 
 (0.0047) (0.4628) 
DIV_PAYER * IP -0.0152** 0.0161 
 (0.0181) (0.4815) 
ABS_REM 0.0101***  
 (0.0081)  
OWNER 0.0093*** -0.0085 
 (0.0016) (0.5908) 
GOVERN -0.0221*** -0.1920*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0000) 
BIG4 0.0027 0.0277 
 (0.4417) (0.1830) 
LEVER 0.0002 -0.0057*** 
 (0.2331) (0.0000) 
EO -0.0053*** 0.0235*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0016) 
SIZE 0.0017*** 0.0238*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0000) 
TAX -0.0343*** 0.0374 
 (0.0000) (0.2905) 
ABS_DACC  0.3110*** 
  (0.0083) 
Constant 0.0679*** 0.2599*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   
Observations 2,510 2,510 
R-squared 0.0608 0.0944 
P-values in parentheses     
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
Notes: The table reports the results of the two regressions using as dependent variables the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals and the absolute value of real earnings management. The sample 
consists of 503 entities, examined for the period 2009-2015.  The models estimated are, for all 
specifications: Earnings management proxy = f(x), where x are the variables related to each 
specification. The numbers in parenthesis are the values of the test statistic. ***, ** and * show the 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. All numbers are rounded up to the forth decimal 
place. 
 
Looking at the results above, it is observed that in the case of discretionary 
accruals there is a negative and significant effect of the interaction of DIV_PAYER with 
the dummy variable IP at a 5% significance level. The coefficient of IP in this case 
represents the unique effect of weak investor protection in the case where DIV_PAYER 
equals to zero. More specifically, the coefficient of 0.0179 indicates that non-payers 
engage more in accrual manipulation in weak investor protection environment. The 
second column of Table 6 shows that the interaction term DIV_PAYER*IP is significantly 
negative (-0.0152). The coefficient of the interaction term represents the incremental 
effect that the inclusion of the IP variable has on the coefficient of the DIV_PAYER. Thus, 
the association between DIV_PAYER and ABS_DACC is stronger in firms that operate in 
countries with poor investor protection than in strong investor protection environment. 
In other words, dividend payers manipulate accruals to a smaller extend in countries 
with weak investor protection.  
In the case of real activities manipulation, the coefficients of the main variables 
are not statistically significant. This implies that, based on the available data, the 
characteristics of the investor protection environment that the firm operates in do not 
affect the relationship between dividend paying status and real earnings management.  
5. Conclusions 
The present analysis aims to examine the influence of dividend policy on 
earnings management activities and adds to the existing literature by also using the 
Beneish model in this attempt. Moreover, the analysis is extended to testing the effect 
of investor protection on the dividends-earnings management relationship. Examining 
a sample of 503 firms for a seven year period (2009-2015), it is shown that dividend 
payers are associated with lower levels of earnings manipulation especially in countries 
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with a weak investor protection regime. The test results indicate that all of the 
hypotheses stated earlier in Section 2 cannot be rejected.  
The first hypothesis H1 assumed that, compared to non-payers, dividend payers 
are associated with lower levels of earnings management. Regardless of which method 
is used in order to measure earnings management (discretionary accruals, real activities 
manipulation or the Beneish probability of earnings manipulation) the coefficients of 
DIV_PAYER are statistically significant and negative, meaning that the hypothesis is 
validated by all of the three regressions described earlier. These results support the 
works of Tong et al.(2011) and He et al.(2017) and also verify them by one more method 
with the inclusion of the Beneish model in the analysis.  
According to hypothesis H2 if the pre-managed earnings of the current year do 
not cover the dividends of the previous year, earnings management is expected to be 
noticed to a greater extent. The estimated coefficient of DEFICIT, which is the main 
variable for testing H2, is highly positively significant in the case where discretionary 
accruals are used as the regressand. Contrary to the case of accrual manipulation, real 
earnings management presents a negative relationship with the deficit. That can be 
explained by the fact that as real earnings management increases, a deficit is less likely 
to be developed. In addition to this, deficit is usually tackled through accrual 
manipulation since it can be observed at the year end and not before. The level of the 
payment is crucial in the case of real activities manipulation for the same reason.  The 
expected payment level is based on previous fiscal year data and directors can manage 
resources and operations throughout the ongoing fiscal year in order to achieve the 
desired results at the year end. 
The last hypothesis H3 claims that compared to countries with strong investor 
protection, in countries with weak investor protection, dividend paying status is more 
closely associated with lower levels of earnings management. Essentially it is in line with 
the “substitute model” of dividends in combination with the work of He et al.(2017). The 
results of the regressions support the hypothesis when the discretionary accruals are 
used as the variable explained. When real activities manipulation is used as the 
predicted variable, no statistically significant relationship is observed between earnings 
management, dividend policy and investor protection, at least to the extent of this 
examination.  
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Inevitably, the present analysis suffers from some potential limitations. First and 
foremost, the sample used cannot be considered unbiased. Due to data availability, the 
majority of the companies is either from the USA or the UK. As a result, the financial and 
regulatory environment of these two areas may affect the analysis to a greater extent 
than the conditions of the other countries which take part in the examination. 
Furthermore, since earnings management is a human decision, individual psychology 
and culture must be taken into account. Different countries host a variety of cultural 
values and personal ethos that could possibly influence such decisions. Last but not 
least, only some of the factors that have been previously proven to affect earnings 
management are included as control variables in the models. Designing a formula that 
will incorporate all the acknowledged driving forces of earnings manipulation is beyond 
the limits of this dissertation. 
Further research on the topic is suggested since there are still many areas that 
need clarification. For instance, the studies should be extended to a wider geographical 
range, testing more markets with unique cultural, regulatory and financial conditions. In 
addition to this, the reasons that lead different studies to produce contradictory results 
when it comes to examining the matter of the existence of dividend driven earnings 
management, should be identified. Only by understanding those reasons, we might be 
able someday to give a firm answer to what the role of dividends in the matter of 
earnings manipulation actually is.  
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Appendix 
A. Literature Summary 
 
Table A1: Summary of prior research on earnings management 
Author(s) Research matter Importance for this study 
Sample 
data/area 
Sample 
year(s) 
Main model 
Beneish, M.D. (1999) Estimates a model for detecting the 
probability of earnings manipulation. 
An alternative measure of 
earnings management. 
USA  1987-1993 M-Score 
Dechow, P.M., Sloan, 
R.G. and Sweeney, 
A.P. (1995) 
Evaluation of alternative accrual-based 
models for detecting earnings 
manipulation. 
A better model for 
estimating accrual-based 
earnings management. 
1000 
randomly 
selected firm 
years from 
Compustat 
between 
1950 and 
1991 
Modified Jones 
Model 
Jones, J.J. (1991) Tests if firms that would benefit from 
import relief attempt to decrease 
earnings through earnings management 
during import relief investigations. 
Pioneer model for the 
estimation of discretionary 
accruals. 
USA  1980-1985 Jones 
Discretionary 
Accruals Model 
Roychowdhury, S. 
(2006) 
Provides evidence that managers 
manipulate real activities in order to 
avoid reporting annual losses. 
A robust model for 
estimating real activities 
manipulation. 
All firms in 
Compustat 
1987-2001 The relation 
between 
earnings and 
cash flows as 
proposed by 
Dechow et al. 
(1998) 
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Table A2: Summary of prior research on dividend policy 
Author(s) Research matter Importance for this study 
Sample 
data/area 
Sample 
year(s) 
Main model 
Brav, A., Graham, J. 
R., Harvey, C. R., & 
Michaely, R. (2005) 
Interview financial executives to 
determine the motives behind dividends 
and share repurchases decisions. 
Provides an insight behind 
the motives that drive 
dividend policies. 
Responses from 
384 financial 
executives 
April 2002 N/A 
La Porta, R., Lopez‐
de‐Silanes, F., 
Shleifer, A., & 
Vishny, R. W. (2000) 
Tests two agency problems of dividends: 
the "outcome" model and the 
"substitute" model. 
Provides an insight behind 
the motives that drive 
dividend policies. 
4,103 firms 
from 33 
countries 
1989-
1994 
N/A 
  N/A = not applicable 
 
 
Table A3: Summary of prior research on dividend-driven earnings management 
Author(s) Research matter 
Importance for 
this study 
Sample 
data/area 
Sample 
year(s) Main model 
Proxy for earnings 
and/or earnings 
management 
Atieh, A. & Hussain, 
S. (2012) 
They suggest that 
earnings management is 
mostly conducted by 
dividend payers when 
they fail to meet their 
dividend targets rather 
One more 
application of  the 
"Deficit" model 
UK 1994-2004 Deficit is the key 
variable. 
Discretionary accruals 
computed by the 
Modified Jones Model 
as proposed by 
Dechow et al. (1995) 
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than by non-payers who 
want to avoid losses.  
Bennett B. & 
Bradbury, M.E. 
(2007) 
They introduce an 
earnings threshold 
related to dividend 
cover. 
Management's 
reluctance to cut 
dividends sets the 
importance of 
earnings threshold. 
New 
Zealand 
1986-2002 Dividend cover 
earnings threshold. 
Net Profit after Tax 
(Scaled by Total 
Assets) 
Daniel, N. D., Denis, 
D. J., & Naveen, L. 
(2008) 
They provide evidence 
that managers 
consider expected 
dividend levels (as a 
result of debt 
covenants) a significant 
earnings threshold. 
Introduction of the 
"Deficit" model. 
USA 1992–2005 Deficit (operating 
cash flow and total 
accruals minus 
preferred dividends) 
is the key variable. 
Discretionary accruals 
as proposed by 
Jones(1991) 
He, W., Ng, L.,Zaiats, 
N. & Zhang, B. (2017) 
They test if there is a 
relationship between 
dividend policy and 
earnings management 
and if this relationship 
varies across countries 
with different degrees 
of institutional strength 
and transparency. 
Dividends are 
associated with 
earnings 
management and 
financial 
environment's 
characteristics. 
23,429 
firms from 
29 
countries 
1990-2010 Multivariate analysis 
on the association 
between dividend 
paying status and 
investor protection 
variables. 
Discretionary accruals 
as proposed by 
Jones(1991) 
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Kasanen, 
E.,Kinnunen, J. & 
Niskanen, J. (1996) 
Provides evidence on 
earnings management 
driven by the fact that 
large institutional 
shareholders expect 
smooth dividend 
streams 
Provides 
motivation for 
further research 
Finland 1970-1989 Predicted and actual 
earnings 
management 
Dividend-based target 
earnings minus 
unmanaged earnings 
or Actually reported 
minus unmanaged 
earnings before tax 
 
Tong, Y. H., & Miao, 
B. (2011) 
They find proof that 
dividend payers are 
associated with lower 
levels of earnings 
management 
Dividends are 
associated with 
earnings 
management and 
earnings quality 
All firms in 
Compustat 
1988-2004 Multivariate analysis 
on the association 
between dividend 
paying status and 
earnings quality 
Discretionary accruals 
as proposed by 
Jones(1991) and the 
Modified Jones Model 
as proposed by 
Dechow et al. (1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
44 
 
B. Investor protection indices 
Table B1: World Bank Database Indicators 
Abbreviation Full name Details 
EDL Extent of director liability index It has seven components and ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating 
greater liability of directors. 
SIP Strength of investor protection index It is an average of 3 indices-the extent of disclosure index, the extent of director 
liability index, and the ease of shareholder suit index. Higher values indicate better 
protection with the index ranging from 0 to 10. 
ECT Extent of corporate transparency index Corporate transparency on ownership stakes, compensation, audits and financial 
prospects. Ranges from 0 to 9. 
DCI Depth of credit information index The index measures rules affecting the scope, accessibility, and quality of credit 
information available through either public or private credit registries. It ranges from 
0 to 10, with higher values indicating the availability of more credit information to 
facilitate lending decisions.  
SLR Strength of legal rights index  The index captures the access to capital by measuring the degree to which collateral 
and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders. It ranges from 0 to 
10, with higher scores indicating that laws are better designed to expand access to 
credit.  
Source: World Bank, Doing Business Project 
  
 
Table B2: Estimation of maximum IP-Score 
maxIP-Score =maxEDL+maxSIP+maxECT+maxDCI+maxSLR+maxLAW= 
 =10+10+9+10+10+1= 
 =50 
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C. Summary of the variables employed 
Table C1: Variable summary 
Variable Definition Data Source 
A Total Assets Bloomberg database 
AB_CFO Abnormal cash flow from operations estimated by the 
Roychowdury model (2006) 
Bloomberg database 
AB_EXP Abnormal discretionary expenditures estimated by the 
Roychowdury model (2006) 
Bloomberg database 
AB_PROD Abnormal production costs estimated by the Roychowdury 
model (2006) 
Bloomberg database 
ABS_DACC Absolute value of residual accruals obtained from the 
Modified Jones Model proposed by Dechow et al. (1995) 
Bloomberg database 
ABS_REM Absolute value of Real earnings management as proposed by 
Roychowdury(2006) 
Bloomberg database 
BEN A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has a 
higher than acceptable probability of earnings manipulation 
(M_Score < -1.78) and 0 otherwise 
Bloomberg database 
BIG4 A dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if the firm is 
audited by one of the Big4 auditing firms and 0, otherwise 
Bloomberg database 
CFO Cash flow from operations Bloomberg database 
DACC Residual accruals obtained from the Modified Jones Model 
proposed by Dechow et al. (1995) 
Bloomberg database 
DEFICIT Max(0, earnings shortfall) (Daniel et al.,2008) Bloomberg database 
DISEXP Discretionary expenditures which include R&D, Advertising 
and Sales, General and administrative costs 
Bloomberg database 
DIV_LEV Dividends scaled by total assets Bloomberg database 
DIV_PAYER A binary variable that takes the value of 1, if the firm paid 
dividends in the previous year and 0, if the firm did not pay 
any dividend in the previous year 
Bloomberg database 
EO A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm’s equity 
has risen in the following year, and 0 otherwise 
Bloomberg database 
GOVERN The percentage of independent directors on the board Bloomberg database 
IP A binary variable that takes the value of 1, if the country's 
investor protection is weak and 0 otherwise. 
World Bank's "Doing 
Business" database 
and The CIA World 
Factbook 
IP-Score  The sum of World Bank's Database Indicators and LAW 
(Maximum possible score = 50) 
World Bank's "Doing 
Business" database 
and The CIA World 
Factbook 
LAW A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm is of 
common law origin, and 0 if a firm is of civil law origin 
The CIA World 
Factbook 
LEVER The ratio of long term debt to total assets Bloomberg database 
M_Score The sum of Days Sales in Receivables Index (DSRI), Gross 
Margin Index (GMI), Asset Quality Index (AQI), Sales Growth 
Index (SGI), Depreciation Index (DEPI), Sales General and 
Bloomberg database 
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Administrative Expenses Index (SGAI), Leverage Index (LVGI) 
and Total Accruals to Total Assets (TATA) (Beneish, 1999). 
OWNER The percentage of shares held by insiders Bloomberg database 
PPE Property, plant and equipment Bloomberg database 
PROD Production costs Bloomberg database 
REM Real earnings management as the sum of AB_CFO, AB_PROD 
and AB_EXP  (Roychowdury,2006) 
Bloomberg database 
S Revenue Bloomberg database 
SIZE The ratio of market capitalization to total assets Bloomberg database 
TACC Net Income minus Cash flow from operations Bloomberg database 
TAX Total tax rate on profits World Bank's "Doing 
Business" database 
ΔREC The change in accounts receivable Bloomberg database 
ΔS The change in revenues Bloomberg database 
 
 
D. List of abbreviations 
CEO : Chief Executive Officer 
CFO : Chief Financial Officer 
EPS : Earnings per Share 
GAAP : General Accepted Accounting Principles 
IASB : International Accounting Standards Board 
IFRS : International financial reporting standards 
IPO  : Initial Public Offering 
SEO : Seasoned Equity Offering 
 
 
